Low Power Elliptic Curve Cryptography by Ozturk, Erdinc
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Digital WPI
Masters Theses (All Theses, All Years) Electronic Theses and Dissertations
2005-05-04
Low Power Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Erdinc Ozturk
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/etd-theses
This thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Digital WPI. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses (All Theses, All Years) by an
authorized administrator of Digital WPI. For more information, please contact wpi-etd@wpi.edu.
Repository Citation
Ozturk, Erdinc, "Low Power Elliptic Curve Cryptography" (2005). Masters Theses (All Theses, All Years). 691.
https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/etd-theses/691
Low Power Elliptic Curve
Cryptography
by
Erdinc¸ O¨ztu¨rk
A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty
of the
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science
in
Electrical Engineering
by
April, 2004
Approved:
Dr. Berk Sunar
Thesis Advisor
ECE Department
Dr. Brian King
Thesis Committee
ECE Department
Dr. David Cyganski
Thesis Committee
ECE Department
Dr. Fred J. Looft
Department Head
ECE Department
Abstract
This M.S. thesis introduces new modulus scaling techniques for transforming a class
of primes into special forms which enable efficient arithmetic. The scaling technique
may be used to improve multiplication and inversion in finite fields. We present an
efficient inversion algorithm that utilizes the structure of a scaled modulus. Our in-
version algorithm exhibits superior performance to the Euclidean algorithm and lends
itself to efficient hardware implementation due to its simplicity. Using the scaled mod-
ulus technique and our specialized inversion algorithm we develop an elliptic curve
processor architecture. The resulting architecture successfully utilizes redundant rep-
resentation of elements in GF (p) and provides a low-power, high speed, and small
footprint specialized elliptic curve implementation.
We also introduce a unified Montgomery multiplier architecture working on the
extension fields GF (p), GF (2m) and GF (3m). With the increasing research activity
for identity based encryption schemes, there has been an increasing need for arith-
metic operations in field GF (3m). Since we based our research on low-power and
small footprint applications, we designed a unified architecture rather than having a
seperate hardware for GF3m. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time a
unified architecture was built working on three different extension fields.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The incredible improvements in ubiquitous computing, and its indispensable implica-
tions gives rise to its being an effective domain of interest. As the notion of ubiquitous
computing is becoming more and more part of our lives, various applications consist-
ing of this new technology can be encountered. RFIDs are currently being introduced
into the supply chain. Wireless sensor networks are widely used for many applica-
tions. In some cities most of the people carry at least one contactless smart card in
their pockets.
These applications are becoming widespread, with an ultimate need of security.
Currently, RFID applications have no security at all. Moreover, these applications
1
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have limited power resources, which make them ultra-low power devices. Power-
efficient implementations need to be used. Security applications are a part of the
implementations, so they also have to be power-efficient.
So far, public key cryptography has not even been considered for these devices
due to its perceived complexity. The common perception of public key cryptography
is that it is complex, slow and power hungry, and as such not at all suitable for use
in these environments.
It is therefore common practice to emulate the asymmetry of traditional public
key based cryptographic services through a set of protocols using symmetric key based
message authentication codes (MACs). Although the low computational complexity
of MACs is advantageous, the protocol layer requires time synchronization between
devices on the network and a significant amount of overhead for communication and
temporary storage. The requirement for a general purpose CPU to implement these
protocols as well as their complexity makes them prone to vulnerabilities and prac-
tically eliminates all the advantages of using symmetric key techniques in the first
place.
Our aim is to challenge the basic assumptions about public key cryptography
which are based on a traditional software based approach. We propose a custom
hardware assisted approach for which we claim that it makes public key cryptography
feasible for low-power applications, provided we use the right selection of algorithms
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and associated parameters, careful optimization, and low-power design techniques.
Several public key schemes can be used to provide the security services described
above. We take a closer look at Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC) as the most
promising candidate for low-power implementations. We implemented the hardware
design of a low-power and novel ECC architecture.
1.2 Modular Arithmetic
Modular arithmetic has a variety of applications in cryptography. Many public-key
algorithms heavily depend on modular arithmetic. Among these, RSA encryption
and digital signature schemes, discrete logarithm problem (DLP) based schemes such
as the Diffie-Helman key agreement [DH76] and El-Gamal encryption and signature
schemes [Nat91], and elliptic curve cryptography [Kob87, Men93] play an important
role in authentication and encryption protocols. The implementation of RSA based
schemes requires the arithmetic of integers modulo a large integer, that is in the form
of a product of two large primes n = p · q. On the other hand, implementations of
Diffie-Helman and El-Gamal schemes are based on the arithmetic of integers modulo
a large prime p. While ECDSA is built on complex algebraic structures, the un-
derlying arithmetic operations are either modular operations with respect to a large
prime modulus (GF (p) case) or polynomial arithmetic modulo a high degree irre-
ducible polynomial defined over the finite field GF (2) (GF (2k) case). Special moduli
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for GF (2k) arithmetic were also proposed [Ber68, SOOS95]. Low Hamming-weight
irreducible polynomials such as trinomials and pentanomials became a popular choice
[SOOS95, AMV93] for both hardware and software implementations of ECDSA over
GF (2k). Particularly, trinomials of the form xk + x + 1 allow efficient reduction. For
many bit-lengths such polynomials do not exist; therefore less efficient trinomials, i.e.
xk + xu + 1 with u > 1, or pentanomials, i.e. xk + xu + xv + xz + 1, are used instead.
Hence, in many cases the performance suffers degradation due to extra additions and
alignment adjustments.
In this thesis we utilize integer moduli of special form, which is reminiscent of
low-Hamming weight polynomials. Although the idea of using a low-Hamming weight
integer modulus is not new [Cra92], its application to Elliptic Curve Cryptography
was limited to only elliptic curves defined over Optimal Extension Fields (i.e. GF (pk)
with mid-size p of special form), or non-optimal primes such as those utilized by the
NIST curves [Nat91]. In this work we achieve moduli of Mersenne form by introducing
a modulus scaling technique. This allows us to develop a fast inversion algorithm that
lends itself to efficient inversion hardware. For proof of concept we implemented a
specialized elliptic curve processor. Besides using scaled arithmetic and the special
inversion algorithm, we introduced several innovations at the hardware level such
as a fast comparator for redundant arithmetic and shared arithmetic core for power
optimization. The resulting architecture requires extremely low power at very small
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footprint and provides reasonable execution speed.
1.3 Thesis Outline
After a short introduction into the motivation of the work done in this thesis and
a brief introduction to the modular arithmetic in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 will present
some of the earlier works in the field. The concepts that we used in our research will
be analyzed for useful ideas.
Following that, in Chapter 3, modulus scaling techniques that were used for the
background research of this thesis will be presented. Also in this chapter, the inversion
algorithm that was achieved by modulus scaling techniques will be described and
analyzed for hardware implementation. Chapter 4 presents the reader the system
architecture of the design that has been developed as part of this thesis.
Chapter 5 presents a unified multiplier architecture that can work for three ex-
tension fields. First the background research is presented, than the structure of the
presented hardware is described. The algorithms used for Montgomery multiplication
are examined in this chapter.
Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the research done for this thesis. It briefly explains
the results of the research done.
Chapter 2
Previous Work
A straightforward method to implement integer and polynomial modular multipli-
cations is to first compute the product of the two operands, t = a · b, and then to
reduce the product using the modulus, c = t mod p. Traditionally, the reduction
step is implemented by a division operation, which is significantly more demanding
than the initial multiplication. To alleviate the reduction problem in integer modular
multiplications, Crandall proposed [Cra92] using special primes, primes of the form
p = 2k − u, where u is a small integer constant. By using special primes, modular
reduction turns into a multiplication operation by the small constant u, that, in many
cases, may be performed by a series of less expensive shift and add operations.
Let the number t represent the 2k-bit result of a multiplication operation of two
k-bit numbers. Let tl represent the low k-bits and th represent the high k-bits:
6
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t = th2
k + tl
hence c = th2
k + tl (mod p)
which can be reduced for p = 2k − u to
c = th · u + tl (mod 2
k − u) .
It should be noticed that th · u is not fully reduced. Depending on the length of
u, a few more reductions are needed. The best possible choice for a special prime is
a Mersenne prime, p = 2k − 1, with k fixed to a word-boundary, i.e. k = 16, 32, 64.
In this case, the reduction operation becomes a simple modular addition c = th +
tl mod p. Similarly primes of the form 2
k + 1 may simplify reduction into a modular
subtraction c = tl − th mod p. Unfortunately, Mersenne primes and primes of the
form 2k + 1 are scarce. For degrees up to 1000 no primes of form 2k + 1 exist and
only the two Mersenne primes 2521 − 1 and 2607 − 1 exist. Moreover, these primes
are too large for ECDSA which utilizes bit-lengths in the range 160 − 350. Hence,
a more practical choice is to use primes of the form 2k − 3. For a constant larger
than u = 3, and a degree k that is not aligned to a word boundary, some extra shifts
and additions may be needed. To relax the restrictions, Solinas [Sol99] introduced a
generalization for special primes. His technique is based on signed bit recoding. While
increasing the number of possible special primes, additional low-level operations are
needed. The special modulus reduction technique introduced by Crandall [Cra92]
restricts the constant u in p = 2k − u to a small constant that fits into a single word.
Chapter 3
Modulus Scaling Techniques
3.1 General Method
The idea of modulus scaling was introduced by Walter [Wal92]. In this work, the
modulus was scaled to obtain a certain representation in the higher order bits, which
helped the estimation of the quotient in Barrett’s reduction technique. The method
works by scaling to the prime modulus to obtain a new modulus, m = p · s. Reducing
an integer a using the new modulus m will produce a result that is congruent to the
residue obtained by reducing a modulo p. This follows from the fact that reduction
is a repetitive subtraction of the modulus. Subtracting m is equivalent to s times
subtracting p and thus (a mod m) mod p ≡ a mod p . When a scaled modulus is
used, residues will be in the range [m− 1, 0] = [s · p− 1, 0]. The number is not fully
8
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reduced and essentially we are using a redundant representation where an integer is
represented using dlog2 semore bits than necessary. Consequently, it will be necessary
that the final result is reduced by p to obtain a fully reduced representation. Here we
wish to use scaling to produce moduli of special form. If a random pattern appears
in a modulus, it will not be possible to use the low-weight optimizations discussed in
Chapter 2. However, by finding a suitable small constant s, it may be possible to scale
the prime p to obtain a new modulus of special form, that is either of low-weight or
in a form that allows efficient recoding. To keep the redundancy minimal, the scaling
factor must be small compared to the original modulus. Assuming a random modulus,
such a small factor might be hard or even impossible to find. We concentrate again
on primes of special forms.
3.2 Special Primes
We present two heuristics that form a basis for efficient on-the-fly scaling using primes
of special forms:
3.2.1 Heuristic 1
Heuristic 1 If the base B representation of an integer contains a series of repeating
digits, scaling the integer with the largest possible digit, produces a string of repeating
zero digits in the scaled and recoded integer.
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The justification of the heuristic is quite simple. Assume the representation of the
modulus in base B contains a repeating digit of arbitrary value D. We use the
constant scaling factor s = B−1 to compute m. When a string of repeating D-digits
is multiplied with the scaling factor, and written in base B we obtain the following
(DDDD . . . DDD)B · (B − 1) = (DDDD . . . DDD0)B − (DDDD . . . DDD)B
= (D000 . . . 000D¯)B.
The bar over the least significant digit denotes a negative valued digit.
We provide the following example:
Example 1 We select the following prime
p = (51234567812345678123456781234567812345678123456807)16.
By inspection we identify (12345678)16 as a repeating pattern. By selecting the base
B = 232, the repeating pattern becomes a digit. The scaling factor is the largest digit
s = B − 1 = 232 − 1 = (FFFFFFFF)16. The scaled modulus is computed as
m = s · p
= (51234567300000000000000000000000000000000000000085DCBA97F9)16
The representation may contain more than one repeating digit. For instance, the
prime
p = (57777777777777333333333338B)16
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has two repeating digits 7 and 3. Since both fit into a digit in base B = 16, scaling
with B − 1 = 15 will work on both strings:
m = p · s
= (57777777777777333333333338B)16 · (F )16
= (51FFFFFFFFFFFFC0000000000525)16.
= (520000000000004¯0000000000525)16.
The presented scaling technique is simple, efficient, and only requires the modulus
to have repeating digits. Since the scaling factor is fixed and only depends on the
length of the repeating pattern – not its value –, a modulus with multiple repeating
digits can be scaled properly at the cost of increasing the length of the modulus by a
single digit. We present another heuristics for scaling, this technique is more efficient
but more restrictive on the modulus.
3.2.2 Heuristic 2
Heuristic 2 Given a modulus containing repeating D-digits in base B representation,
if B − 1 is divisible by the repeating digit, then the modulus can be efficiently scaled
by the factor B−1
D
.
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As earlier the heuristic is verified by multiplying a string of repeating digits with the
scaling factor and then by recoding.
(DDD . . . DDD)B ·
B − 1
D
= ((B − 1)(B − 1)(B − 1) . . . (B − 1))B
= (1000 . . . 01¯)B.
The following example shows the power of this simple technique.
Example 2 Let the prime p be
p = (D79435E50D79435D79435E50D79435E50D79435E50D79435E50D79435E50‖
D79435E50D79435E50D79435E50D79435E5)16
By inspection the repeating pattern is detected as D = (0D79435E5)16. The digit D
fits into 36-bits, thus the base is selected as B = 236. Since D|(B − 1) the scaling
factor is computed as
s =
236 − 1
(0D79435E5)16
= 19.
The scaled modulus becomes
m = s · p = 2384 − 2320 − 1.
We have compiled a list of primes that when scaled with a small factor produce
moduli of the form 2k ± 1 in Table 4 (see Appendix A). These primes provide a wide
range of perfect choices for the implementation of cryptographic schemes.
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3.3 Scaled Modular Inversion
In this section we consider the application of scaled arithmetic to implement more
efficient inversion operations. An efficient way of calculating multiplicative inverses
is to use binary extended Euclidean based algorithms. The Montgomery inversion
algorithm proposed by Kaliski [Kal95] is one of the most efficient inversion algorithms
for random primes. Montgomery inversion, however, is not suitable when used with
scaled primes since it does not exploit our special moduli. Furthermore, it can be
used only when Montgomery arithmetic is employed. Therefore, what we need is
an algorithm that takes advantage of the proposed special moduli. Thomas et al.
[TKL86] proposed the Algorithm X for Mersenne primes of the form 2q − 1 (see
Appendix B).
Due to its simplicity Algorithm X is likely to yield an efficient hardware implemen-
tation. Another advantage of Algorithm X is the fact that the carry-free arithmetic
can be employed. The main problem with other binary extended Euclidean algo-
rithms is that they usually have a step involving comparison of two integers. The
comparison in Algorithm X is much simpler and may be implemented easily using
carry-free arithmetic.
The algorithm can be modified to support the other types of special moduli as
well. For instance, changing Step 4 of the algorithm to b := −(2q−eb) (mod p)
will make the algorithm work for special moduli of the form 2q + 1 with almost no
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penalty in the implementation. The only problem with a special modulus, m is the
fact that it is not prime (but multiple of a prime, m = sp) and therefore inverse of
an integer a < m does not exist when gcd(a,m) 6= 1. With a small modification to
the algorithm this problem may be solved as well. Without loss of generalization the
solution is easier when s is a small prime number. Algorithm X normally terminates
when y = 1 for integers that are relatively prime to the modulus, m. When the
integer a is not relatively prime to the modulus, then Algorithm X must terminate
when y = gcd(a,m) = s resulting b = a−1 · s (mod m). In order to obtain the
inverse of a when gcd(a,m) 6= 1, an extra multiplication at the end is necessary:
b = b · (s−1 (mod p)) (mod m)
where s−1 (mod p) needs to be precomputed. This precomputation and the task
of checking y = s as well as y = 1, on the other hand, may be avoided utilizing
the following technique. The integer a, whose inverse is to be computed, is first
multiplied by the scale s before the inverse computation: a′ = a ·s . When the inverse
computation is completed we have the following equality
a′ · b + m · k = s
and thus
a · s · b + p · s · k = s .
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When both sides of the equation is divided by s we obtain
a · b + p · k = 1.
Therefore, the algorithm automatically yields the inverse of a as b = a−1 if the input
is taken as s · a mod m instead of a. Although this technique necessitates an extra
multiplication before the inversion operation independent of whether a is relatively
prime to modulus m or not, eliminating the precomputation and a comparison is a
significant improvement in a possible hardware implementation. Furthermore, this
multiplication will reduce to several additions when the scale is a small integer such
as the s = 3 in p = (2167 + 1)/3. Another useful modification to Algorithm X is to
transform it into a division algorithm to compute operations of the form d/a. The
only change required is to initialize b with d instead of 1 in Step 1 of the algorithm.
This simple modification saves one multiplication in elliptic curve operations. The
Algorithm X modified for division with scaled modulus is shown below:
CHAPTER 3. MODULUS SCALING TECHNIQUES 16
Algorithm X - modified for division with scaled modulus
Input: a ∈ [1,m− 1], d ∈ [1,m− 1], m, and q where m = 2q ± 1
Output:b ∈ [1,m− 1], where b = d/a (mod m)
1: a := a · s (mod m);
2: (b, c, u, v) := (d, 0, a,m);
3: Find e such that 2e||u
4: u := u/2e; // shift off trailing zeros
5: b := ∓(2q−eb) (mod m); // circular left shift
6: if u = s return b;
7: (b, c, u, v) := (b + c, b, u + v, u);
8: go to Step 3
It should be noted that the notation 2e||u stands for the largest integer value of e
such that 2e exactly divides u.
One can easily observe that the Algorithm X has the loop invariant b/u (mod m) ≡
d/a (mod m) . Note that the Step 3 of Algorithm X can be performed using simple
circular left shift operations. The advantage of performing the Step 3 with simple
circular shifts may dissappear for moduli of the form 2q−c with even a small c. Many
inversion algorithms consist of a big loop and the efficiency of an inversion algorithm
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of k
depends on the number of iterations in this loop, k , which, in turn, determines the
total number of additions, shift operations to be performed. The number of iterations
are usually of random nature (but demonstrates a regular and familiar distribution)
and only statistical analysis can be given. In order to show that Algorithm X is also
efficient in terms of iteration number, we compared its distribution for k against that
of Montgomery inversion algorithm. We computed the inverses of 10000 randomly
chosen integers modulo m = 2167 + 1 using Algorithm X. Since p = m/3 is a 166-bit
prime we repeated the same experiment with the Montgomery inversion algorithm
using p. Besides having much easier operations in each iteration we observed that the
average number of iterations of Algorithm X is slightly lower than the total number
of iterations of the Montgomery inversion algorithm (Figure 3.1).
Chapter 4
The Elliptic Curve Architecture
We developed an elliptic curve architecture using the scaled modulus technique and
our specialized inversion algorithm. Our aim in implementing this hardware was to
actually see the outcomes of our techniques.
4.1 Design Methodology
We built our elliptic curve scheme over the prime field GF ((2167 +1)/3). This partic-
ular prime allows us to use a scaled modulus m = 2167 + 1 with a very small scaling
factor s = 3. To implement the field operations we use Algorithm X as outlined in
Chapter 3.3. Our simulation for this particular choice of prime showed that our inver-
sion technique is only by about three times slower than a multiplication operation.
Furthermore, the inversion is implemented as a division saving one multiplication
18
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operation. Thus the actual ratio is closer to two. Since inversion is relatively fast,
we prefer to use affine coordinates. Besides faster implementation, affine coordinates
provides a significant amount of reduction in power and circuit area since projective
coordinates requires a large amount of extra storage. For an elliptic curve of form
y2 = x3 + ax + b defined over GF (2167 + 1)/3) we use the standard point addition
operation defined in [Men93].
For power efficiency we optimize our design to include minimal hardware. An
effective strategy in reducing the power consumption is to spread the computation
to a longer time interval via serialization which we employ extensively. On the other
hand, a reasonable time performance is also desired. Since the elliptic curve is de-
fined over a large integer field GF (p) (168-bits) carry propagations are critical in the
performance of the overall architecture. To this end, we built the entire arithmetic
architecture using the carry-save methodology. This design choice regulates all carry
propagations and delivers a very short critical path delay, and thus a very high limit
for the operating frequency.
The redundant representation doubles all registers in the arithmetic unit, i.e. we
need two separate registers to hold both the carry part and the sum part of a number.
Furthermore, the inherent difficulty in comparing numbers represented in carry-save
notation is another challenge. In addition, shifts and rotate operations become more
cumbersome. Nevertheless, as evident from our design it is possible to overcome these
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difficulties.
In developing the arithmetic architecture we primarily focused on finding the
minimal circuit to implement Algorithm X efficiently. Since the architecture is built
around the idea of maximizing hardware sharing among various operations, the mul-
tiplication, squaring and addition operations are all achieved by the same arithmetic
core. The control is hierarchically organized to implement the basic arithmetic opera-
tions, point addition, point doubling, and the scalar point multiplication operation in
layers of simple state machines. The simplicity of Algorithm X and scaled arithmetic
allows us to accomplish all operations using only a few small state machines.
4.2 Implementation of the Control Block
Since the arithmetic core is a general purpose hardware, we needed a control block
that can handle the desired arithmetic operations by switching the select inputs of
the multiplexers accordingly. We have a 15-state state machine implementing the
inversion algorithm. Each state corresponds to a step in the algorithm. Mainly there
are three states in the state machine: Initialize, shift right, and add.
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Figure 4.1: Block diagram of the arithmetic unit
4.3 Implementation of the Arithmetic Unit
The arithmetic unit shown in Figure 4.1 is built around four main registers R0, R1, R2, R3,
and two extra registers Rtemp0, Rtemp1 which are used for temporary storage. Note
that these registers store both the sum and carry parts due to the carry-save repre-
sentation. For the same purpose the architecture is built around two (almost) parallel
data paths.
We briefly outline the implementation of basic arithmetic operations.
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4.3.1 Comparison
Comparing a two numbers in carry-save architecture is difficult since the redundant
representation hides the actual values. On the positive side, the comparison in Al-
gorithm X is only with respect to a constant value of s = 3. Such a comparator
may be built using a massive OR tree with 2n inputs. Unfortunately, such an OR
tree would cause serious latency (O(log2 n) gate delays) and significantly increase the
critical path delay. We instead prefer a novel comparator design that works only for
comparing a number with zero. In order to compare a number with 3, extra logic is
needed for the first two bits, which is nothing more than a pair of xor gates. The
rest of the bits are connected directly to the comparator. The comparator is built
by connecting three-state buffers together as shown in Figure 4.2. The input lines
are connected together and set to logic 1. Similarly the output lines are connected
together and taken as the output of the comparator. We feed the bits of the data
input in parallel to the enable inputs of the three-state buffers. Hence, if one or more
of the bits of the data input is logic 1, which means the number is not equal to 0, we
see logic 1 at the output of the comparator. If the number is 0, none of the three-state
buffers is enabled and therefore we see a Hi-Z (high impedance) output. Note that
our comparator design works in constant time (O(1) gate delays) regardless of the
length of the operands.
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Figure 4.2: Comparator unit built using tri-state buffers
4.3.2 Modulo Reduction
Since the hardware works for m = 2167 + 1, 168-bit registers would be sufficient.
However, we use an extra bit to detect when the number becomes greater than m. If
one of the left-most bits of the number (carry or sum) is one, the number is reduced
modulo m. Note that
2168 = 2 · (2167 + 1)− 2 = 2m− 2 = m− 2 (mod m).
Hence, the reduction is achieved by subtracting 2168 (or simply deleting this bit) and
adding m− 2 = (11 . . . 11111)2 (167 bits) to the number. If both of the leftmost bits
are 1 then: 2 · (2168) = 4 · (2167 + 1) − 4 = 4m − 4 = m − 4 (mod m) . Therefore
m − 4 = (111 . . . 11101)2 (167 bits) has to be added to the number and both of the
leftmost bits are deleted.
4.3.3 Subtraction
Suppose k is a 168 bit number which we want to subtract from another number
modulo m. The bitwise complement of k is found as
k′ = (2168 − 1)− k = 2 · (2167 + 1)− 3− k = −3− k (mod m) .
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Thus −k = k′ + 3 mod m. This means that to subtract k from a number we simply
add the bitwise complement of k and 3 to the number. There is a caveat though.
Remember that our numbers are kept in carry save representation, so, there are
two 168-bit numbers representing k. Let ks and kc denote the sum and carry parts
of k, respectively. Since k = ks + kc then −k = −ks − kc = (k
′
s + 3) + (k
′
c + 3) =
ks
′+kc
′+6 mod m. Therefore the constant value 6 has to be added to the complements
of the carry and sum registers in order to compute −k.
4.3.4 Multiplication
We serialize our multiplication algorithm by processing one bit of one operand and all
bits of the second operand in each iteration. The standard multiplication algorithm
had to be modified to make it compatible with the carry save representation. Due
to the redundant representation, the value of the leftmost bit of the multiplier is not
known. Hence, the left to right multiplication algorithm may not be used directly.
We prefer to use the right to left multiplication algorithm. With this change, instead
of shifting the product we multiply the multiplicand by two (or shift left) in each
iteration step.
There are 3 registers used for the multiplication: R0 (multiplicand), R1 (product)
and R2 (multiplier). The multiplication algorithm has 3 steps :
1. Initialization: This is done by the control circuit. The multiplicand is loaded
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to R0, the multiplier is loaded to R2 and R1 is reset.
2. Addition: This step is only done when the rightmost bit of register R2 is 1. The
content of register R0 is added to R1.
3. Shifting: The multiplier has to be processed bit by bit starting from the right.
We do this by shifting register R2 to the right in each iteration of the multi-
plication. Since the register R2 is connected to the comparator, the algorithm
terminates after this step if the number becomes 0 else the algorithm continues
with Step 2. Note that no counters are used in the design. This eliminates
potential increases in the critical path delay. The multiplicand needs to be dou-
bled in each iteration as well. This is achieved by shifting register R0 to the
left. This operation is performed in parallel with shifting R2, so no extra clock
cycles are needed. However, shifting to the left can cause overflow. Therefore,
the result needs to be reduced modulo m if the leftmost bit of the register R0
is 1.
4.3.5 Inversion
To realize the inversion operation there are four registers used to hold b, c, u and
v, two temporary registers are used for the addition of two numbers in carry-save
architecture. Two carry-save adders, multiplexers and comparator architecture are
also utilized.
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The inversion algorithm shown in Algorithm X has 5 steps:
1. Initialization: This is done by the control circuit. Load registers with b = 1, c =
0, u = x (the data input) and v = m = (2167 + 1).
2. u = u/2e: This operation is done by shifting u to the right until a 1-bit is
encountered. However, due to the carry-save architecture this operation requires
special care. The rightmost bit of the carry register is always zero since there
is no carry input. Thus just checking the rightmost bit of the sum register is
sufficient. Also, the carry has to be propagated to the left in each iteration.
This is done by adding 0 to the number. If a 1-bit is encountered, the operation
proceeds to the next step.
3. b = (−2q−e · b) mod m: Assume u holds a random pattern, e will be very small
(not more than 3 for most of the cases). Thus, q − e is most likely a large
number. Therefore, multiplication by 2q−e would require many shifts to left. To
compute this operation more efficiently, this step is rewritten using the identity
2q = −1 mod m as b = 2−e · b (mod m) . Therefore, b needs to be halved
e-times. If b is even we may shift it to the right and thereby divide it by two.
Otherwise, we add m to it to make it even and then shift. Since this step takes e
iterations, it can be performed concurrently with the 2nd step of the algorithm.
Hence no extra clock cycles are needed for this step.
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4. Compare u with s = 3:The comparator architecture explained above is used to
implement this step. There are two cases when u = 3: us = (11)2, uc = (00)2
and us = (01)2, uc = (10)2. Therefore, the rightmost two bits need a special
logic for the comparison, and the rest of the bits are connected directly to the
three-state comparator shown in Figure 4.2.
5. Additions in (b, c, u, v) := (b+ c, b, u+v, u). Two clock cycles are needed to add
two numbers in carry-save architecture, since a carry-save adder has 3 inputs
and there are 4 numbers to add. During the addition operation to preserve the
values of b and u the two temporary registers are used.
4.4 Performance Analysis
In this section we analyze the speed performance of the overall architecture and
determine the number of cycles required to perform the elliptic curve operations.
The main contributors to the delay are field multiplications and inversion operations.
Field additions are performed in 1 cycle (or 2 cycles if both operands are in the
carry-save representation). Therefore field additions which take place outside of the
multiplication or inversion operations are neglected.
The multiplication operation iterates over the bits of one operand. On average
half of the bits will be ones and will require a 2 cycle addition. Hence, 168 clock cycles
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will be needed. The multiplicand will be shifted in each cycle and modulo reduced
in about half of the iterations. Hence another 1.5 · 168 = 252 cycles are spent. The
multiplication operation takes on average a total of 420 cycles.
The steps of the inversion algorithm are reorganized in Table 1 according to the
order and concurrency of the operations. Note the two concurrent operations shown
in Step 2. In fact this is the only step in the algorithm which requires multiple clock
cycles, hence the concurrency saves many cycles. In Step 2, u is shifted until all zero
bits in the LSB are removed. Each shift operation takes place within one cycle. For
a randomly picked value of u the probability of the last e bits all being zeroes is
(1/2)e, hence the expected value of e is E(e) =
∑
∞
i=1 i(1/2)
i = 2. In each iteration
of the algorithm we expect on average of 2 cycles to be spent. Step 3 does not
spend any cycles since the comparator architecture is combinational. The additions
in Step 4 require 2 clock cycles. Hence a total of 4 cycles is spent in each iteration
of the inversion algorithm. Our simulation results showed that (see Section 3.3) the
inversion algorithm would iterate on average about 320 times. The total time spent
in inversion is found as 1, 280 cycles. This is very close to our hardware simulation
results which gave an average of 1, 288 cycles.
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1: Initialize all registers
(b, c, u, v)← (1, 0, a,m)
2: Shift off all trailing zeros and rotate b
u← u >> e b← b >> e (mod m)
3: Check terminate condition
if u = s return b
4: Update variables
(b, c, u, v)← (b + c, b, u + v, u);
go back to Step 2
Table 1: Hardware algorithm for inversion.
The total number of clock cycles for point addition and doubling is found as 2, 120
and 2, 540, respectively. The total time required for computing a point multiplication
is found as 545, 440 cycles.
4.5 Results and Comparison
The presented architecture was developed into Verilog modules and synthesized using
the Synopsys tools Design Compiler and Power Compiler. In the synthesis we used
the TSMC 0.13 µm ASIC library, which is characterized for power. The resulting
architecture was synthesized for three operating frequencies. The implementation
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Figure 4.3: Implementation Results
results are shown in Figure 4.3. As seen in the figure the area varies around 30 Kgates.
The circuit achieves its intended purpose by consuming only 0.99 mW at 20 Mhz.
In this mode the point multiplication operation takes about 31.9 msec. Although
this is not very fast, this operating mode might be useful for interactive applications
with extremely stringent power limitations. On the other hand, when the circuit is
synthesized for 200 Mhz operation, the area is slightly increased to 34 Kgates, and
the power consumption increased to 9.89 mW. However, a point multiplication takes
now only 3.1 msec.
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We performed a research to obtain the resutls from the previously built ECC ar-
chitectures. However, we concluded with a result that there has not been any work
done for low-power ECC architecture design. We compare our design with another
customized low-power elliptic curve implementation presented by Schroeppel et al. in
CHES 2002 [SBM+02]. Their design is the closest to a low-power ECC design. Their
design employed an elliptic curve defined over a field tower GF (2178) and used spe-
cialized field arithmetic to minimize the design. A point halving algorithm was used
in place of the traditional point doubling algorithm. The design was power optimized
through clock gating and other standard methods of power optimization. The main
contribution was the clever minimization of the gate logic through efficient tower field
arithmetic. Note that their design includes a fully functional signature generation ar-
chitecture whereas our design is limited to point multiplication. Although a side by
side comparison is not possible, we find it useful to state their results: The design was
synthesized for 20 Mhz operation using 0.5 µm ASIC technology. The synthesized
design occupied an area of 112 Kgates and consumed 150 mW. The elliptic curve
signature was computed in 4.4 msec. Unfortunately, since we did not have access to
the 0.5 µm technology, which would have made the comparison precise.
An architectural comparison of the two designs shows that our design operates bit
serially in one operand whereas their design employs a more parallel implementation
strategy. This leads to lower critical paths and much smaller area in our design. The
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much shorter critical path allows much higher operating frequencies requiring more
clock cycles to compute the same operation. However, due to the smaller area, when
operated at similar frequencies our design consumes much less power.
Chapter 5
Unified Multiplier Architecture
5.1 Introduction
There has been an increase in research activity for the cryptosystems on pairing
based operations. Schemes utilizing these pairing schemes, such as identity based
encryption [BF01] and signature algorithms have been developed. Identity based
cryptography was first proposed by Shamir [Sha85] in 1985. Rather than deriving a
public key from a private information, which would be the case in traditional schemes,
in identity based schemes a user identity, an arbitrary string, plays the role of a public
key. This reduces the computations for authentication and has a number of security
characteristics. These identity based schemes are implemented the most efficient on
the field GF (3m).
33
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Previously we designed an ECC hardware which works on the extension field
GF (p). Since the identity based encryption schemes are getting more important and
there is more research being conducted on these schemes, we realized the importance
of adding the field GF (3m) to our design for identity based cryptography. Since we
based our design on small footprint and low-power application, we aimed on building
a unified architecture that supports arithmetic in three fields, GF (p), GF (2m) and
GF (3m) rather than having separate hardware for all of them. The results of our
research on previous work showed that previously a unified architecture for GF (p)
and GF (2m) has been built ([STK00]). Also, hardware architectures for arithmetic
in characteristic three have appeared in [PS02], [TKM04]and [BGK+03]. However, to
the best of our knowledge, a unified architecture working for all the three fields has
not been appeared.
The basic arithmetic operations (i.e., addition, multiplication and inversion) in
the arithmetic extension fields GF (p), GF (2m) and GF (3m) have several applica-
tions in elliptic curve cryptography. The most important of these three arithmetic
operations is the field multiplication operation since it is the core operation in many
cryptographic functions. The Montgomery multiplication algorithm [Mon85] is an ef-
ficient method for performing modular multiplication. With this motivation and, we
designed a Unified Montgomery Multiplier Architecture for the arithmetic extension
fields GF (P ), GF (2m) and GF (3m) using a different number representation.
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5.2 Redundant Signed Digit (RSD) Arithmetic
Although carry-save arithmetic decreases the propagation delay in addition oper-
ations, the use of carry-save arithmetic for modular subtraction operations, which
is required for arithmetic in algebraic fields introduces significant problems. When
two’s complement representation is used for subtraction, the carry overflow must be
ignored. If there is no carry overflow, the result is negative. Since there can be hidden
carry overflow with carry-save representation, it is hard to be sure that the result is
positive or negative. It requires additional operations and additional hardware, which
increases both latency and area.
RSD arithmetic was introduced by Avizienis [Avi61] and is quite similar to carry-
save arithmetic. An integer is still represented by two positive integers, however the
non-redundant form of the representation is the difference between these two positive
integers, not the sum. If the number X is represented by x+ and x− then X = x+−x−.
One advantage of using RSD is the fact that it eliminates two’s complement form
to handle negative numbers. It is thus much easier to do both addition and subtraction
operations without worrying about the carry and borrow chain. Furthermore, the
subtraction operation does not require taking two’s complement of the subtrahend.
It is thus a more natural representation if both addition and subtraction operations
have to be performed, which is the case in the Montgomery inverse algorithm. Also,
comparison of two integers is much easier with RSD representation. After subtracting
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one integer from the other one, sign test can be performed directly by testing the first
nonzero bit, which is an easy way of telling which number is bigger than the other
one.
5.2.1 Number Representations
As mentioned before, the integer X is represented by two integers, x+ and x−, and
X = x+−x−. For RSD representations, we can use the notation (x+, x−) to represent
the number X.
The RSD number representation for the given extension fields are described as
follows:
1. GF (p) In the extension field GF (p), the integers are in binary form and a digit
can have three different values: 1, 0 and −1. In RSD form, these three digits
are represented as:
1 → (1, 0)
0 → (0, 0)
−1 → (0, 1)
2. GF (2m) In field GF (2m), the integers are also in binary form. However, since
there is no carry chain in GF (2) arithmetic, a digit can have the values 1 or 0.
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These are represented as:
1 → (1, 0)
0 → (0, 0)
3. GF (3m) In field GF (3m), the integers are in base 3. Digits can have the values
−2 −1 0 1 and 2. However, since there is no carry chain in GF (3m) arithmetic,
the digit values −2 and 2 are congruent to 1 and −1, respectively. The RSD
representations are:
2 → (0, 1)
1 → (1, 0)
0 → (0, 0)
−1 → (0, 1)
−2 → (1, 0)
5.3 Unified Arithmetic Core
We first build a unified arithmetic core for the basic arithmetic operations (i.e., ad-
dition, subtraction and comparison). The core is unified so that it can do the arith-
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Figure 5.1: Generalized full adders
metic operations in three extension fields, GF (p), GF (2m) and GF (2n). Since the
elements of these fields are represented using almost the same data structure inside
the computer, and the algorithms for basic arithmetic operations in all three fields
have structural similarities, we were able to build a unified arithmetic core.
5.3.1 Architecture
The conventional 1-bit full adder assumes positive weights for all of its three binary
inputs and two outputs. However, full adders can be generalized to have both positive
and negative weight inputs and outputs. This allows us to construct an adder design
with both inputs and outputs in RSD form, since we can have negative weight numbers
as inputs. In our core design, we used two forms of the generalized full adders (Figure
5.1), one negative weight input (GFA-1) and two negative-weight inputs (GFA-2).
The logic behaviors of these generalized full adders are shown in Figure 5.2). As
can be seen from the truth table, they have same logical characteristics. The only
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Figure 5.2: Logic tables of the three generalized full adders
difference is the order of the inputs and outputs. Same hardware is used for both
of the generalized full adders. However, it should be noted that the decoding of the
outputs are different. For GFA-1, the result is decoded as 2c − s. For GFA-2, the
result is decoded as −2c + s.
A 1-digit adder unit is constructed using two of the generalized full adders (Figure
5.3). This adder unit has two integers in RSD representation as inputs and one integer
in RSD representation as output. This 1-digit unit also has carry inputs and outputs,
which are only used for arithmetic in GF (p). In total, the unit has 5 bits of input
and 3 bits of output.
We started designing the hardware for the extension field GF (p) first. Two gener-
alized full adders connected as shown in figure 5.3 without any other logic in between
handles the arithmetic operations in GF (p).
Since the carry chain in GF (2m) arithmetic is neglected, all we had to do to make
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this architecture also work for GF (2m) was suppressing the carry chain. Also, since
the digits can have the values (0, 0) and (1, 0), the negative weight inputs of the adder
are initialized as logic 0.
Modifying this hardware design so that it will also work for GF (3m) is the most
complex part of the design. Since the numbers are in base 3 form and we have
a hardware that works for base 2, the design became complicated. The carry-free
structure of the GF (3m) arithmetic operations allowed us to build an adder which
works for both base 3 and binary forms.
When doing arithmetic operations in GF (3m), the outputs of the adders has to
be decoded. Since the generalized full adder works in binary form, the output is also
binary. We needed to convert this output to base 3 before entering the data into the
second generalized full adder. An XOR gate and an AND gate is sufficient enough
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for this conversion (figure 5.3). There is also need for multiplexers, and the select
inputs of the multiplexers determine in which field the adder is working. The carry
bits seen are only used for GF (p).
Now all we need to do is to connect the 1-digit RSD units back to back in order to
build an n-bit RSD adder. Figure 5.4 shows the backbone of the structure. There are
n 1-digit RSD adders and just one GFA-1 adder to handle the last carry bit, which
is omitted in GF (2m) and GF (3m).
5.3.2 Addition
The addition operation is done as shown in Figure 5.4. The negative and positive
parts of the numbers are entered accordingly and the select inputs of the multiplexers
are set for desired field operations. There are two control inputs for selecting the
field, sel2 and sel3. These inputs are decoded accordingly and they determine the
select inputs of the multiplexers.
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5.3.3 Subtraction
Subtraction operation is identical to the addition operation. The only difference is
that the positive and the negative parts of the numbers in RSD form are swapped
before the operation. Swapping the positive and negative parts negates the number:
X = (x+, x−) = x+ − x−
Y = (y+, y−) = y+ − y−
X − Y = (x+, x−)− (y+, y−) = (x+, x−) + (y−, y+)
5.3.4 Comparison
In order to perform comparison between two numbers, one must be subtracted from
the other one. After subtraction, a sign test is applied to the result. Doing the sign
test is a simple process as it can be performed directly by testing the first nonzero bit
pair. If the positive part of first nonzero bit pair is logic 1, the subtracted number is
smaller than the other one. If the negative part of the first nonzero bit pair is logic
1, the subtracted number is greater than the other one. If all the bit pairs are zero,
the numbers are equal. Since our proposed hardware does not allow both of the bit
pairs be logic 1 at the same time, there is no need to check if both of the bit pairs
are logic 1.
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5.4 Montgomery Multiplication
The proposed adder design is used to build a Montgomery multiplier architecture.
Since there are three different extension fields upon which we want our hardware to
work on, the algorithm had three different versions. We tried to find the similarities
of these versions and integrate them together into a single hardware implementation.
5.4.1 The Multiple-Word Radix-2 Montgomery Multiplica-
tion Algorithm for GF (p)
The use of a fixed precision word alleviates the broadcast problem in the circuit
implementation. Furthermore, a word-oriented algorithm allows design of a scalable
unit.
For a modulus of m-bit precision, and a word size of w-bits, e = dm + 1/we words
are required. Note that an extra bit is used for the variables holding the partial sum
in the Montgomery algorithm for GF (p), since the partial sums can reach m + 1-
bit precision. The algorithm [TK99] we used scans the multiplicand operand (B)
word-by-word, and the multiplier operand (A) bit-by-bit.
The vectors used in multiplication operations are expressed as
B = (B(e−1), ..., B(1), B(0)),
A = (A(m−1), ..., A(1), A(0)),
CHAPTER 5. UNIFIED MULTIPLIER ARCHITECTURE 44
p = (p(e−1), ..., p(1), p(0)),
where the words are marked with superscripts and the bits are marked with subscripts.
For example, the ith bit of the kth word of B is representeed as B
(k)
i . A particular
range of bits in a vector B from position i to j where j > i is represented as Bj..i.
(x|y) represents the concatenation of two bit sequence. Finally, 0m stands for an
all-zero vector of m bits. The algorithm is given below:
Input: A,B ∈ GF (p) and p
Output:C ∈ GF (p)
Step 1: T := 0m
Step 2: for i = 0 to m− 1
Step 3: (Carry|T (0)) := ai ·B
(0) + T (0)
Step 4: Parity := T
(0)
0
Step 5: (Carry|T (0)) := Parity · p(0) + (Carry|T (0))
Step 6: for j = 1 to e− 1
Step 7: (Carry|T (j)) := ai ·B
(j) + T (j) + Parity · p(j) + Carry
Step 8: T (j−1) := (T
(j)
0 |T
(j−1)
w−1..1)
Step 9: T e−1 := (Carry|T
(e−1)
w−1..1)
Step 10: C := T
Step 11: if C > then C := C − p
Step 12: return C
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We use the RSD form for every vector used in the multiplication algorithm, so
every bit expressed in this algorithm is represented by actually two bits, positive and
negative parts of the numbers. As an example: T 00 = (T
0
0,p, T
0
0,n).
5.4.2 Multiple-Word Radix-2 Montgomery Multiplication Al-
gorithm for GF (2m)
The Montgomery multiplication algorithm for GF (2m) is given below. Since there is
no carry computation in GF (2m) arithmetic, the intermediate addition operations are
replaced by bitwise XOR operations, which are represented below using the symbol
⊕.
Input: A,B ∈ GF (2m) and p
Output:C ∈ GF (2m)
Step 1: T := 0m
Step 2: for i = 0 to m− 1
Step 3: T (0) := aiB
(0) ⊕ T (0)
Step 4: Parity := T
(0)
0
Step 5: T (0) := Parity · p(0) ⊕ T (0)
Step 6: for j = 1 to e− 1
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Step 7: T (j) := aiB
(j) ⊕ T (j) ⊕ Parity · p(j)
Step 8: T (j−1) := (T
(j)
0 |T
(j−1)
w−1..1)
Step 9: T (e−1) := (0|T
(e−1)
w−1..1)
Step 10: C := T
Step 12: return C
Notice that this algorithm differs from the previous one only with the carry chain.
5.4.3 Multiple-Word Radix-3 Montgomery Multiplication Al-
gorithm for GF (3m)
Montgomery multiplication algorithms for GF (p) and GF (2m) are similar to each
other because they are both implemented in r‘adix-2 and they only differ in the carry
chain. Since we implement Montgomery multiplication algorithm for GF (3m) in
radix-3, there have to be some changes in the implementation. We already explained
the differences for the addition part in RSD representation and we showed that radix-2
and radix-3 representations can be both implemented on a single hardware.
For a modulus of m-bit precision and a word size of w-bits, e = dm + 1/we words
are required. Since there is no carry computation in GF (3m) arithmetic, there won’t
be any extra digits used other than the variable vectors. Every digit is represented
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by two bits in the hardware, one for positive and one for negative, since the numbers
are in RSD representation. The algorithm scans the operand B word-by-word, and
the operand A digit-by-digit. In radix-3 representation, the digits are marked with
subscripts. For example, the ith digit of the kth word of B is represented as B
(k)
i .
(x, y) represents a digit in RSD representation. The algorithm is given below:
Input: A,B ∈ GF (3m) and p
Output:C ∈ GF (3m)
Step 1: T := 0m
Step 2: for i = 0 to m− 1
Step 3: T (0) := ai ·B
(0) + T (0)
Step 4: if T
(0)
0 = p
(0)
0 then
Step 5: T (0) := T 0 − p(0)
Step 6: for j − 1 to e− 1
Step 7: T (j) := ai ·B
(j) + T (j) − p(j)
Step 8: T (j−1) := (T
(j)
0 |T
(j−1)
w−1..1)
Step 9: else
Step 10: T (0) := T 0 + p(0)
Step 11: for j − 1 to e− 1
Step 12: T (j) := ai ·B
(j) + T (j) + p(j)
Step 13: T (j−1) := (T
(j)
0 |T
(j−1)
w−1..1)
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Step 14: T (e−1) := ((0, 0)|T
(e−1)
w−1..1)
Step 15: C := T
Step 16: if C < T then C := C + p
Step 17: return C
5.5 Multiplier Architecture
5.5.1 Pipeline Organization
All of the three different algorithms are concurrent in the loops, outer and inner loops
with the variables i and j. Each processor unit is responsible for one step of the outer
loop with the variable i. Each processor unit gets the ai digit as input. Also, every
processor unit gets B(j), p(j) and T (j) as inputs, according to the inner loop variable
j. The pipelined structure is shown in Figure 5.5.
An important aspect of this pipeline organization is the register file design. The
digits ai of the multiplier A are given serially to the PUs, and are used only for
one iteration of the outer loop. So they can be discarded immediately after use.
Therefore, a simple shift register with a load input would be sufficient. Also, rather
than registering the multiplier A in the hardware, we can have a serial input for
every digit and we register the necessary ai digits inside the hardware, whenever
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T
. . . 
T0 T0
SR−T
SR−B
SR−p
a0 ak−1
SR−A
PU
Stage 1
PU
Stage k
Figure 5.5: Pipeline organization
needed. This will reduce the area and power use of the hardware. The registers for
the modulus p and multiplicand B can also be shift registers.
The multiplication starts with the first PU unit. It starts by processing the first
iteration of the outer loop of the algorithms. As can be seen from the algorithm,
enough data will be ready for the second iteration to start in 2 clock cycles. Therefore,
the second PU has to be delayed from the first PU by 2 clock cycles. This is done by
using two stages of registers in between. Also, these registers are handling the shift
operations for the partial sum (Step 8 of the algorithms) as shown in Figure 5.5.
When the first PU is done with the operations of an iteration step of the outer
loop, it starts working on the next available iteration loop, and the second PU will
be done in 2 clock cycles and start working on the next available iteration, and this
goes on for the entire pipeline organization. If there is no pipeline stall, which means
if the first PU is done with an iteration when the last PU operated on an iteration
CHAPTER 5. UNIFIED MULTIPLIER ARCHITECTURE 50
for clock cycles, there is sufficient enough PUs and no need for intermediate shift
registers to hold the data. The pipeline can go on working without stalling. However,
if the number of PUs is not sufficient enough, which means if pipeline stalls occur,
the modulus and multiplicand words generated at the end of the pipeline have to be
registered. SR − T , SR − p and SR − B are shift registers to hold these data when
there is pipeline stall. The length of these shift registers are of crucial importance
and are determined by the number of pipeline stages (k) and the number of words
(e) in the modulus. The width of the shift registers is equal to w, the word size. The
length of these registers can be given as
L =


e− 2 · (k − 1) : if(e + 1) > 2k
0 : otherwise.
The global control block was not mentioned since its function can be inferred from
the algorithms.
5.5.2 Processing Unit
The processing unit consists of two layers of adder blocks, which we call Unified
Arithmetic Core. The function of a Unified Arithmetic Core was described in section
5.3. It is capable of doing addition and subtraction operation in fields GF (p), GF (2m)
and GF (3m). The block diagram of a processing unit with the word size w=3 is shown
in figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.6: Processing Unit (PU) with w = 3.
As can be seen in the figure, a PU is responsible for performing the operation:
ai ·B
(j) + T (j) ± p(j)
This step is common for all the three fields, so this part of the PU is a very simple
combination of the unified arithmetic cores. The inputs to these adders come from
decoders designed to handle arithmetic in three different fields.
We need a simple logic for multiplying one digit ai of the multiplier A with one
word B(j) of the multiplicand B (for the part ai · B
(j)). Since ai can only have the
values (0, 0), (1, 0) or (0, 1), the result of ai ·B
(j) can be 0, B(j) or −1·B(j) respectively.
Negating an integer is simply swapping positive and negative bits of digits, so a simple
and small special encoder would be sufficient for this.
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We need another logic to find the parity for every iteration of the outer loop.
We check the right-most digit of the modulus, (p00) and the right-most digit of the
operation T (0) = a0 ·B
(0) + T (0), T 00 and find the parity:
Parity =


(0, 0) : ifT 00 = (0, 0)
(0, 1) : ifp00 = T
0
0
(1, 0) : otherwise
So, this is very similar to the previous encoder logic we used. One difference is
that since the parity is calculated only once for every iteration step, it needs to be
registered after being calculated by the PU.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis we demonstrated that scaled arithmetic, which is based on the idea of
transforming a class of primes into special forms that enable efficient arithmetic, can
be profitably used in elliptic curve cryptography. To this end, we implemented an
elliptic curve cryptography processor using scaled arithmetic. Implementation results
show that the use of scaled moduli in elliptic curve cryptography offers a superior
performance in terms of area, power, and speed. We proposed a novel inversion
algorithm for scaled moduli that results in an efficient hardware implementation. It
has been observed that the inversion algorithm eliminates the need for projective
coordinates that require prohibitively a large amount of extra storage. The successful
use of redundant representation (i.e. carry-save notation) in all arithmetic operations
including the inversion with the introduction of an innovative comparator design leads
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to a significant reduction in critical path delay resulting in a very high operating
clock frequency. The fact that the same data path (i.e. arithmetic core) is used for
all the field operations leads to a very small chip area. Comparison with another
implementation demonstrated that our implementation features desirable properties
for resource-constrained computing environments.
We also implemented a Unified Multiplier Architecture for the extension fields
GF (p), GF (2m) and GF (3m). Considering the results we obtained from the previous
architecture, we used a different number representation, Redundant Signed Digit
representation. As a result we achieved the construction of a novel and low-power
architecture for Montgomery multiplication algorithm.
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Appendix A
Modulus Scaling
A table of special primes is given below. Each row lists all degrees up to i = 1024 for
which a prime exists in the form specified at the beginning of the row.
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Prime 0 < i < 1024
2i + 1 1, 2, 4, 8, 16
2i + 3 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 16, 12, 15, 16, 18, 28, 30, 55, 67, 84, 228, 390, 784
2i + 5 1, 3, 5, 11, 47, 53, 141, 143, 191, 273, 341
3 · 2i + 1 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 12, 18, 30, 36, 41, 66, 189, 201, 209, 276, 353, 408, 438, 534
5 · 2i + 1 1, 3, 7, 13, 15, 25, 39, 55, 75, 85, 127
3 · 2i + 5 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, 16, 19, 22, 24, 27, 29, 32, 38, 54, 57, 60, 76, 94, 132, 139, 175,
187, 208, 230, 379, 384, 632
5 · 2i + 3 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 18, 20, 26, 28, 32, 34, 43, 44, 50, 52, 58, 65, 66, 107, 140, 197
274, 280, 380, 393, 506, 664, 738, 875, 944, 1016
2i − 1 2, 3, 5, 7, 13, 17, 19, 31, 61, 89, 107, 127, 521, 607
2i − 3 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 20, 22, 24, 29, 94, 116, 122, 150, 174, 213, 221, 233, 266, 336,
452, 545, 689, 694, 850
2i − 5 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 18, 20, 26, 32, 36, 56, 66, 118, 130, 150, 166, 206, 226, 550, 706, 810
3 · 2i − 1 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 18, 34, 38, 43, 55, 64, 76, 94, 103, 143, 206, 216, 306, 324, 391, 458, 470, 827
5 · 2i − 1 2, 4, 8, 10, 12, 14, 18, 32, 48, 54, 72, 148, 184, 248, 270, 274, 420
3 · 2i − 5 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 13, 15, 25, 31, 34, 48, 52, 64, 109, 145, 162, 204, 207, 231, 271, 348, 444, 553, 559
5 · 2i − 3 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 17, 20, 27, 29, 30, 36, 62, 72, 83, 117, 119, 137, 149, 152, 176, 201, 243, 470,
540, 590, 611, 887, 996
Table 2: List of special primes up to degree 1024.
In the following table a list of scaled moduli of the form 2k±1 is shown.The scaling
factor and the prime modulus is provided in the same row.
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Modulus Scale Prime Modulus (hexadecimal)
283 − 1 167 C4372F855D824CA58E9
292 + 1 17 F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F1
297 − 1 11447 B73493DECFD9B68318EF9
2101 + 1 3 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAB
2104 + 1 257 FF00FF00FF00FF00FF00FF01
2107 + 1 1929 10FCAEA5E3998C02A77B49EB9
2116 + 1 1009681 109DC950DA32FC88E84D688F1
2127 + 1 3 2AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAB
2131 − 1 263 7C97D9108C2AD4329DB02EB8F166349
2148 + 1 17 F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F1
2167 + 1 3 2AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAB
2179 − 1 514447 104E5A80A157457ABC6482776A0E7EE78C616DA91
2191 + 1 3 2AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAB
2197 − 1 7487 1181B149E3E4C85E5F1FB2507D481CB8C6DD39E358BAD41
2199 + 1 3 2AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAB
2233 + 1 39173361 DB47AE1104FD220D294905CAD4166DB817CE5936FBFBCAC5B411
2281 − 1 80929 19E9D9CE852ACD5A5A35C4EAA034F0BFF8EA0E7187964BD94B554C27D831862B81F
2313 + 1 3 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAB
2356 + 1 17 F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F1
Table 3: Scaled moduli of the form 2k ± 1.
Appendix B
Inversion Algorithm for Mersenne
Primes of the Form 2q − 1
Algorithm X
Input: a ∈ [1, p− 1], p, and q where p is prime and p = 2q − 1
Output:b ∈ [1, p− 1], where b = a−1 (mod p)
1: (b, c, u, v) := (1, 0, a, p);
2: Find e such that 2e||u
3: u := u/2e; // shift off trailing zeros
4: b := (2q−eb) (mod p); // circular left shift
5: if u = 1 return b;
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6: (b, c, u, v) := (b + c, b, u + v, u);
7: go to Step 2
